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CHAPTER 8:
“THE SECOND FINANCIALISATION IN FRANCE, OR HOW EXECUTIVES AND DIRECTORS
WITH UNCHANGED FINANCIAL CAREERS PROMOTED A NEW CONCEPTION OF
CONTROL”
PIERRE FRANÇOIS, CLAIRE LEMERCIER
How far do the careers of the managers and directors matter for the contemporary financialisation?
They can be related in two ways. Change in the careers of managers and directors can be seen as a
consequence of financialisation: the growing importance of financial activities and the increasing
power of financial firms imply that financiers are now more likely to get to top positions in the main
firms.  Therefore,  financialisation  can  be  seen  as  one  of  the  main  streams  that are  reworking
the economic  elites  (Mizruchi,  2013).  But  changes  in  careers  can  also  be  seen  as  a  cause  of
financialisation. If some actors (for example, former chief financial officers) who seldom reached
the top of firms are more and more central, they are more likely to promote financial logics in the
firms they now run. In this regard, changes in careers can be seen as one of the key mechanisms that
might explain the financialisation of firm strategies (Zorn, 2004). 
In this paper, we will discuss these two main ways to relate the careers of members of the economic
elite and financialisation, focusing on the French case. We will more precisely focus on the CEOs of
the 120 largest publicly listed French firms, as well as on the 210 persons who sat in at least two of
their  boards in 2009 (the two groups partly overlap).  We will  show that  the financialisation of
French  firms  did  not  change  the  main  divides  that  structure  the  French  economic  elite.  The
sociology and history of French elites has long pointed out the impressive stability of the origins
and  education  of  CEOs,  and  especially  the  role  played  by  a  few  schools  in  operating  this
reproduction under the guise of Republican elitism. Accordingly, elite schools channel careers into
two  separate  groups,  those  who  go  through  the  top  schools  and  the  highest  offices  in  the
administration, and those who, after graduating from slightly less prestigious schools, directly join
firms (as regards CEOs, Bourdieu & de Saint-Martin, 1978, and for a review of the literature Joly,
2007; on the French elites more generally Bourdieu, 1989). Our study confirms that the CEOs of the
21st century do not differ much from their predecessors and that a large minority comes from the
administration,  but  it  also  puts  forwards  a  different  divide,  that  has  been  undermined  by this
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literature: that between financial and non-financial careers. Financiers have always been there, at
least from the 1950s on. The growing importance of financial activities and logics within French
firms has not spectacularly changed the structure of the French economic elite. 
And yet, the stability of this structure does not imply that the careers of directors or top managers
played no role in the process of financialisation. We indeed find that the dividend yield of each firm,
which can be considered as a proxy of its orientation toward shareholder value, is significantly
correlated with the presence of financial careers among its multipositioned directors and/or CEO
(François & Lemercier, 2016; such a correlation did not exist in 1979). This correlation holds all
other things being equal, whereas, for example, the type of shareholders or the position of the firm
in the network of interlocking directorates have no independent effect. Financial careers (as defined
below in “Data and methods”) therefore matter for financialisation in France: they seem to produce
a specific “conception of control,” as defined by Fligstein (1990). According to him, conceptions of
controls are shaped by careers, and in turn have an effect on the strategic choices of firms. 
However,  in  order  to  make  that  point,  we  have  to  consider  careers  in  much  more  detail  than
Fligstein did. He doesn't elaborate much on how he coded the background of his CEOs in order to
assign  them one conception of  control  (production,  sales,  or  finance).  This  coding scheme has
something to do with the department of the firm in which they worked before becoming CEOs, but
those (sometimes a majority) who worked neither in production, nor in sales or finance, and those
who went from one of these departments to another, are not discussed. Nor does Fligstein much
consider the fact that many careers spanned several firms or even sectors. On the contrary, we have
carefully reconstructed and taken into account such preliminary steps of the careers. This process,
that is presented in the “Data and methods” section below, is key to our investigation of the –
limited  but  significant  –  changes  in  financial  careers  since  the  1950s  and  the  –  much  more
impressive and influential – changes in the associated conception of control.
Our first result is presented in the first part of this paper: whereas financial careers appear strongly
associated, in the late 2000s, with the adoption of shareholder value, they do not, at first glance,
represent a new path to the boards and CEO seats. Change in orientation toward shareholder value
happened due to the  conversion of a classically selected, trained and experienced elite, not to the
invasion of a foreign, or more generally different, elite. The French story is therefore different from
that told by Fligstein, 1990, and Zorn, 2004, about the rise of chief financial officers to the top of
industrial US firms: the financiers, who happen to play a decisive role in the adoption of a new
conception of control, are not very different from their predecessors of 30 or 50 years ago (see
similarly Davoine & Ravasi, 2013, on a much smaller sample of French firms and shorter time
span). It is also different from the revolution that happened in small European countries such as the
Netherlands or Switzerland (Heemskerk, 2007, David et al., 2012), with the rise of a foreign or
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international elite deserting the classical national career paths. It is after having travelled along the
same career paths that the French financial elite apparently weighed in favor of shareholder value.
In the second part of this paper, we zoom in on the careers of these financiers, in order to specify in
which context of work this conversion is likely to have happened: we find possible loci of change in
specific banks and in offices of the ministry of Finance, as well as in the financial departments.
Box 1: Sources
Our analysis originates with the firms listed in SBF120 in 2009, i.e., broadly speaking, those with the highest
market capitalization (more precisely, those firms are chosen by Euronext among the 200 highest market
capitalizations). We excluded the few firms that were not based in France from our calculations. For 1979
and 1956, we used historical reconstructions of an equivalent of SBF120 (provided by Euronext for 1979 and
by Le Bris, 2001 for 1956). To list the CEOs and board members and gather basic information on firms,
including the way they presented what they did, we used the following sources:
- for 2009: information provided by Euronext, complemented by the public reports of firms (found online in
2010) and Guide, 2011;
- for 1979 and 1956: a directory published for investors, Annuaire Desfossés, years 1980 and 1957.
We coded our firms as financial or non-financial on the basis of the object of the company as presented in
such sources, which leaves room for interpretation. Among financial firms, we included banks, insurance
companies, investment companies, and those real estate companies that, as far as we could understand,
derived more turnover from leasing than from renting or erecting buildings. 
For  each  firm,  we selected  the  CEO,  or  a  reasonable  equivalent  for  firms with  a  different  structure  of
governance (in rare cases, more than one person had to be selected). In addition, we selected all members
of at least two boards in SBF120. Our definition of boards and directors was very inclusive. We considered
as board members the members of  conseils  d'administration,  conseils  de surveillance,  and  conseils  de
censeurs, as well as the 2 to 5 top members of the executive committee (mostly directeurs généraux), even
when the source did not explicitly state that they were also members of boards.
We tried to gather information on more than 60 variables for the CEOs and multiple directors – the total
number of persons in this population was 216 in 1956, when there was comparably little interlocking, 282 in
1979 and 283 in 2009 (the structure of interlocking directorates was very stable between the last two dates).
We lack most information for ca. 110 cases in 1956 (a cohort we only use here to assess that, in spite of
changes in historical context as well as in sources, careers still appear remarkably similar to later ones), but
just 55 in 1979 (20%), and 25 in 2009 (less than 10%).
Some of our variables are positional, i.e. they describe the firms in which the person was a CEO and/or
multiple director at the time of observation, and the position of this person in the network of interlocking
directorates. The other variables are biographical: we looked for information mostly in Who's who in France
(for 2010-2016; 1993-1994; 1979-1980; 1971-1972; 1957-1958) and additionally in other sources for those
we  had  not  found  there  (LesBiographies.com and  Guide,  2011 for  2009;  the  World  Biographical  Index
System and the online database Leonore, for 1956; exhaustive lists of graduates of the elite universities
Polytechnique and Sciences Po were also used for all dates).
We defined as CFS (for “career in the financial sector”) those who had worked as employees (from low-level
to  CEO,  but  excluding  mere  board  members  and  similar  positions)  in  the  financial  sector  before  our
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observation; some of them had also worked for non-financial firms. The financial sector was defined on the
basis of the names of firms where the person was employed, firms being classified as explained above.
There were 105 CFS in 2009 (37% of our population). 
We  defined  as  CFF  (for  “career  including  financial  functions”)  those  who  had  worked  in  financial
departments/functions, e.g. as chief financial officers, internal auditors, etc. There were 84 CFF in 2009 (30%
of our population); some of them were also CFS. 
More generally, we tried to identify all the functions held in firms before reaching the top executive level (that
of  directeur général);  we classified them as production (engineering,  R&D, etc.),  marketing (sales, etc.),
financial, as well as (in addition to the classification in Fligstein, 1990) legal, human resources, management
of a plant (or bank agency, etc.), of a product line (or sector inside the firm), and of a geographical area
(director  for  Europe,  etc.).  Consulting was also coded as a  separate  function and career  step.  Such a
scheme produced several binary variables allowing us to define CFF, careers involving production functions,
etc. It also produced an additive variable describing the number of different functions experienced before
reaching the top of the firm: just one type (e.g. one or several positions related to production); two or more
(e.g.  several  functions in  marketing,  then director  for  Europe,  then  top  executive manager);  none (e.g.
coming from the administration to directly become a CEO);  or “only general functions”. This fourth case
describes careers in firms that begun not at the CEO level, but in the immediate environment of the CEO,
e.g. as secretary of the board or personal adviser of the CEO.
Further details and descriptive statistics are given in François & Lemercier (2016). All the results that we
present here are based on comparisons between dates, or between financial and non-financial careers, that
are significant in terms of Chi2 at the 5% level. The idea of a main divide between CFS and others is based
on specific multiple correspondence analysis (a version of the method that accommodates missing data: Le
Roux & Rouanet, 2004). 
Financial vs. non-financial careers: the main divide in the French economic
elite
Most of  the studies  on the French economic elite  focus on CEOs and on industrial  firms,  and
generally  reconstruct  variables  on  their  background,  as  opposed  to  their  early  careers.  They
therefore undermine the most striking divide within our population of CEOs and multiple directors
of industrial, commercial, and financial firms: that between non-financial and financial (which we
call CFS) careers. Moreover, this is true for the 1956 and 1979 as well as the 2009 cohort, whereas
secondary divides differ. Former officers of the ministry of Finance who afterwards worked in the
financial sector were and are more similar to former managers of banks or insurance companies
without  any  administrative  or  political  experience  than  they  are  to  the  engineers  in  the  State
nobility. 
Box 2: French elite educational institutions
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A large proportion of our population is made of graduates of very specific French institutions called grandes
écoles,  i.e. elite “schools,” a higher education system in competition with universities, that includes both
private and public institutions. In our population, the main ones are Sciences Po, a semi-private university
which interdisciplinary curriculum focuses on law, economics and social sciences (created in the late 19th
century to emulate the London School of Economics); ENA, the “national school for administration,” often
entered after Sciences Po, that leads directly to the highest ranks of the administration; and Polytechnique,
an elite scientific school in which the top graduates join the Ponts or Mines corps: groups of elite engineers
who supervise e.g. energy, transportation, or urban planning for the administration.
Our CFS therefore include careers that begun either in the administration or in the private sector.
What has so significantly distinguished CFS from other careers, from the 1950s to the 2000s? This
divide has to do with social origins (those with CFS are more often Parisian-born, and their fathers
had even more often elite occupations than others), education (in law, in Sciences Po, and/or more
recently in economics, rather than in business or engineering schools), the type of administrative
careers for those who had one, the type of entry-level positions in firms, and the position in the
interlocking directorates network. When CFS passed through the administration, is was in a few
specific departments of the ministry of Finance; they joined firms later than the engineers of the
State nobility, in their forties rather than late twenties; and they worked more often in the personal
staff of ministers, especially the Finance minister or the Prime Minister. As for early careers in
firms, CFS, coming from the administration or otherwise, went straight to the top of firms more
often than others, be it by a direct entry at the top executive level (from the administration or as heir
to a family firm – possibly smaller than an SBF120 firm, of course) or by solely working around the
CEO, as opposed to in a specific department of the firm.
A French  or  even  “Latin”  model  of  careers  of  top  executives  has  sometimes  been  described
(Davoine & Ravasi, 2013) as involving an important mobility both between firms and between
functions in firms, esp. as contrasted to the German model. Managers would be “catapulted” from
outside into firms, and easily move between functional departments. What we show is different:
some French executives are indeed catapulted, but they reach the top directly, and it happens mostly
in finance; multi-functional careers are a different story, they more often happen inside one firm and
do not involve the financial sector. There have been some recent changes in this general pattern: our
2009 cohort, on average, exhibits more complex career paths than in the previous decades, probably
produced by a new way to select and promote so called high-potential managers. For example, the
former CEO of the cement producer Lafarge explained that he established “a secret, pre-established
plan [to train future top executives]: 4 years in this operational department, 3 years in that far-away
country, 2 years in the headquarters, 3 more years running a major subsidiary, and one day access to
the executive committee.” (Lecerf, 1991, 55). Yet even in this new context, CFS remain simpler
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than non-financial careers, and 32% of them still led directly to the top, or only went through the
entourage of a CEO (as opposed to 16% among non-CFS). Those are the over-schooled, supposedly
polyvalent “providential men” whom the same Lecerf advised to avoid: many of his colleagues
apparently  still  praise  them.  On  the  contrary,  the  CEOs  studied  by  Fligstein  (1990,  280-7),
apparently almost never had such straight-to-the-top trajectories (his « general » category, that is
much broader than ours as it includes e.g. the direction of a plant, covers only 6 to 17% of his
population in each period). The existence of a conception of control driven by such direct careers
would deserve further investigations. A lack of experience inside a specific department of the firm,
plus experience alongside the CEO and/or board (probably implying, in the recent years, frequent
contacts with the main shareholders), is likely to encourage an orientation toward shareholder value.
This divide between CFS and other careers is, up to a certain extent, the transposition, in the space
of top managers, of the opposition between financial and non-financial firms. Yet CFS are not only
found in the boards and CEO seats of banks, insurance or investment companies: their presence
matters in large firms more generally. Indeed, one of their other peculiarities is the fact that they are
sought after by non-financial companies, both as CEOs and as multiple board members (Table 1). In
2009, 18 out of the 103 non-financial firms of SB120 (as well as all the financial firms) had a CEO
who had previously worked in finance. 
Table 1: The financiers in boards
% of CFS % of non CFS
Cohort only sitting 
in boards of 
financial 
firms
sitting in 
boards of 
financial and
non-
financial 
firms
only sitting 
in boards of 
non-
financial 
firms
only sitting 
in boards of 
financial 
firms
sitting in 
boards of 
financial and
non-
financial 
firms
only sitting 
in boards of 
non-
financial 
firms
1979 28 % 49 % 23 % 6 % 21 % 48 %
2009 9 % 41 % 50 % 0 % 11 % 89 %
Note: “boards” include CEOs and members of executive committees.
Therefore, if we loosely define as “financialisation” the fact that “finance influences non-finance”,
it could be argued that one of the important channels of this influence in contemporary France is
movements from former managers of banks to CEO and multiple board positions in the largest
industrial and commercial firms. This, however, was already very much true in 1979 (not in 1956),
as shown in Table 1, and by the fact that, in 1979, 20 out of the 79 non-financial firms of SB120
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also had a CEO who had previously worked in finance. This leads us to our main puzzle: if the
careers in the French economic elite,  and the preferences for such careers in the boards of the
largest firms, changed so little between the late 1970s and the late 2000s, then how could they
influence financialisation?
From the first to the second financialisation: loci of conversion
In many ways, when 1979 is compared to 2009, similarities strike more than changes: now and
then, we find the same divide between CFS and other careers, the same peculiarities of CFS, and the
same tendency of  non-financial  firms to  praise CFS in the choice  of  their  CEOs and multiple
directors.  These  similarities  can  seem surprising,  since  the  1950s-1970s,  perhaps  especially  in
France, are generally thought of as a time of industrial growth, admittedly with the beginning of a
crisis  in  heavy  industries  in  the  1970s,  but  certainly  little  independent  influence  of  financial
markets, or even of banks, that are often described as uniformly State-owned or closely controlled
by the  administration  (see  for  example  Coriat,  2008).  Yet  this  narrative  deserves  an  important
qualification. 
In many respects, a first financialisation can be considered to have happened in France from the
1950s to the 1970s. It was not based on market finance or shareholder value and therefore cannot be
confused with the current one. It however involved the birth or quick expansion and diversification
of  very  large  financial  firms,  their  higher  than  ever  centrality  in  the  network  of  interlocking
directorates (the average degree centrality of financial firms was 7,5 in 1956, 11 in 1979 and 10,5 in
2009), and a much larger number of CFS in our 1979 cohort than in 2009. In fact, the very number
of financial firms in SBF120 in 1979 is striking: 39, vs. just 12 in 2009. Thus, finance was already
very  much  present  and  powerful  in  the  late  1970s,  and  some  of  the  central  players  in  the
contemporary financialisation were already among our sample of firms. Indeed, the financial firms
that matter today are not young, whereas many in 1979 were less than 20 years old. For example,
Eurazeo, one of the leading French investment funds, evolved from Eurafrance,  already part of
SBF120 in 1979, which in turn had been created by the partners in Lazard frères, a key non-listed
merchant bank of the 1960s. Lazard frères was already 100 years old at that time and its partners
still control Eurazeo today, together with Crédit Agricole. 
However, stressing the similarities between 1979 and 2009 should not hide the differences between
some of the features and (even more)  causes  of the first  and the second financialisations.  The
financial firms were much more specialized in the late 1970s than thirty years later. They are less
numerous  in  SBF120  in  2009,  but  much  larger,  since  they  have  mostly  absorbed  specialized
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finance, which thrived in independent companies (with interlocks or minority shareholdings by the
main banks of the time) in 1979.  Some of the characteristics of the first financialisation deeply
differ from those of the second. Therefore, comparing the two helps to better describe the latter: not
as a sudden intrusion of finance in an industrial and/or statist world (as in Coriat, 2008), but as a
change in the shape and stated mission of financial firms, as well as in the objectives of financial
and non-financial firms. 
As for its causes, the first financialisation,  i.e. the growth and growing influence on industry of
some financial firms, can be related to specifically French roots. One of those can be found in the
fiscal policy promoted by the French government, which aimed at favoring investment in building,
hence the development of firms that specialized in the financing of the building industry, often in
the dependence of large banks. Another cause of this first financialisation is the reconversion of old
firms in financial activities: some colonial  firms (e.g.  Compagnie du Cambodge) reinvested the
sums they got as compensation when they had to leave the French Empire, and became investment
funds.  The beginning of  the crisis  of  heavy industries  also prompted owners  of  capital  to  exit
(sometimes  selling  their  firm to  the  French  State)  and reinvest  in  portfolio  firms  (such as  the
companies controlled by the Wendel family). The first financialisation thus had very French causes.
They  did  no  longer  operate  during  the  second  financialisation.  Still,  this  new  process  is  not
completely foreign to the history of the French elites. It has been imposed by people whose resumes
generally look the same as their predecessors'; but they have adopted different ways of thinking
about the aims of their firms. To make sense of this conversion, we could put forward a general
atmosphere, something that would have convinced the actors through their readings, interactions
with foreign executives, etc. This would however not explain why firms with more CFS and CFF in
their boards offer higher dividend yields than others. By zooming in on our career data, we can be
more specific about likely loci of conversion – perhaps those in which such readings and encounters
mostly took place.
Finance departments
If one first turns to the usual suspects that have been convened as hypothetical loci of conversion, it
seems that neither changes in the education of the top managers and directors of French firms, nor
their (temporary) migration can explain their conversion to financial logics. The conversion of the
French economic elite is not likely to have happened during their education. There is no doubt that
the curriculum of the main institutions where they have been trained (especially Sciences Po and
ENA) changed a lot in the last decades (Kolopp, 2013), but our population was not exposed to this
change:  we are talking here about  people who were born in  the  1930s and 1940s,  and whose
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education took place between 1950 and 1975, i.e. during the first financialisation, at a time when
the elite French schools taught keynesianism and the prominence of the general interest. The shift in
the strategies of French firms did not come from abroad either. More precisely, if it came from the
adoption of foreign ideas, this did not happen because of the weight of foreign shareholders, which
remain  a  minority (François  & Lemercier,  2016),  or  that  of  foreign  top executives  or  multiple
directors:  a  mere  8% of  our  2009 cohort  was  born  out  of  France,  and less  than  20% of  CFS
(interestingly, even less than for non-financial careers) included a span abroad. 
Another classical way to explain the rise of shareholder value, the growing importance of financial
functions in the career of those who run firms, deserves further attention. We have not yet come
back to our CFF, but their increased frequency is the main change in our database between the first
and second financialisations.  Of course, there were internal auditors and chief financial officers
before, but they rarely became CEOs or multiple directors. We find 5% at most of CFF in 1956.
There were 14% in 1979, but they were mostly found in the specific, arguably non-central position
of representing the same firm (often an insurance company) in the seat specifically assigned to this
company  in  several  boards.  They  were  managers,  but  not  top  executives  of  their  own  firms,
interlockers by accident, so to speak, not specifically sought for by the receiving firm but mere
representatives of a shareholder. 
On the contrary, 30% of our 2009 cohort has held financial functions. Among those 84 persons, 57
were  chief  financial  officers;  27  worked  as  internal  auditors,  in  the  management  control  or
accountancy department, and 32 were financial analysts, or in charge of mergers, participations, etc.
(many went through several of those functions). They entered such position at extremely different
moments, from 1962 to 2008 (for 70%, between 1975 and 1993). What we are considering here is
thus not a precise moment of conversion; it is rather a specific type of function that is likely to
induce a specific view of firms (Fligstein, 1990). As the aforementioned former CEO of Lafarge
stated (regretfully), “the top executive of 1992 has to be comfortable with finance, and it is a big
difference with that of before 1970”, who could be content with having a financial  department
specialize in such matters. Such a change was required because executive committees had to take
part  in  maintaining good relationships with shareholders and in public debates about  the firm's
performance  (Lecerf,  1991,  62).  Indeed,  the  CEO  of  Lafarge  in  2009  (also  a  director  of  the
electricity company EDF), Bruno Lafont, had entered the firm as an internal auditor in 1983 (after
one year in the ministry of Finance). He was the son of a doctor, born in the wealthy suburbs of
Paris, and had graduated both from ENA and a prestigious business school. He then climbed to the
top not only through the function of CFO, but also, in perfect echo to Lecerf's “secret plan”, after
having run subsidiaries and the Turkish branch of Lafarge.
However, what is striking in the French case, and differs from Fligstein's thesis that CFF may be
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considered as vehicles of a new financial, as opposed to a productive or commercial view of the
firm,  is  that  financial  functions  come  as  a  complement,  not  an  alternative to  almost  all  the
previously existing career paths. We find people having held financial functions even among CFS
(although in smaller numbers, because many of the latter still were promoted straight to the top);
among the State nobility as well as in purely private careers; and many of them also held positions
related to production or sales. Three quarters of SBF120 firms now have at least one CFF in their
board,  and  this,  as  well  as  the  presence  of  CFS,  seems  to  influence  their  orientation  toward
shareholder value. Yet those CFF have very little else in common; they come a bit more often from
business schools than non-CFF and have had a little more experience working abroad for foreign
firms, but even those features only describes 20 to 25% of them. What we find here is therefore not
a new profile, but a new addition to some careers in all the old profiles. Yet it is likely that this type
of now required experience shaped attitudes toward shareholder value, and the firm more generally.
As in the US, financial departments have probably been one important locus of conversion; but this
conversion shaped values more than careers themselves. 
For the State nobility: the ministry of Finance
Finally,  whereas  the  early career  profiles  of  CFS changed  very  little,  we can  document  some
changes  in  the  exact  organizations  that  employed  them,  in  order  to  discover  likely  loci  of
conversion.
While the rise in numbers and positions of CFF is the single important change in our career data
from 1979 to 2009, what conversely changed the least is the profile of those CFS who first worked
in the administration. They graduated from ENA, worked in the ministry of Finance, especially as
inspectors (N=16 among CFS in our 2009 cohorts) and/or in the departments of Treasury (N=14) or
Budget (N=6). Many of them spent some time working in the personal staff of the Finance minister
(or one of his under-Secretaries, or the Prime Minister, or the President; N=32). They then often
directly or almost directly became CEOs of a firm, frequently a State-owned or formerly State-
owned company, before moving to the private sector proper. As we have seen, they had been trained
long before  the  curriculum of  ENA included a  socialization  to  the  new rules  of  finance:  their
conversion must have happened after their graduation. Gérard Mestrallet is a good example of such
a career, virtually indistinguishable in its general shape from similar ones in the early 20 th century
(François  & Lemercier,  2014).  The  Parisian  son of  a  “merchant”,  he  typically  graduated  from
Sciences Po and ENA (less typically, also from Polytechnique), worked in the Treasury Department
in 1978-1982, then in the staff of minister of Finance Jacques Delors at the time when the socialist
government first envisioned turning to financial markets for the public debt. Then he directly joined
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Suez, was soon in charge of industrial affairs among the top executives, and became the CEO in
1995. He had the firm focus its business on utilities, but used various financial techniques to do so.
At  the  end  of  the  2000s,  he  was  the  chair  of  Paris  Europlace,  an  organization  aiming  at  the
promotion of the French financial markets – as well as the CEO of Suez Environnement and a board
member of GDF Suez and Saint-Gobain. 
Along with Mestrallet and Gilles Benoist,  whom we will shortly meet, no less than three other
CEOs  and/or  multiple  directors  in  our  2009  cohorts,  Paul  Hermelin,  Philippe  Lagayette  and
Charles-Henri Filippi, had been part of Delors's staff. Four additional top executives of the late
2000s had worked for Delors' under-Secretaries (e.g. Laurent Fabius, in charge of Budget) during
the same key years, in 1981-4. Lemoine (2016) gave a precise account of this period when the
socialist government decided that financing the public debt on the international financial markets
was the only possible option – and that the largest French firms should also resort to market finance
rather than banks. The fact that this period was a turning point could explain the surprising weight
of its veterans at the top of the largest French firms, 25 years after. 
In fact, conversions also happened before and after the Delors period in the ministry of Finance, and
more precisely in its Treasury department. Lemoine's study also documents this point, making sense
of the careers of our CFS who worked in the Treasury in the 1970s or 1990s. This department has
been  key  to  the  diffusion  of  the  idea  that  financial  markets  are  legitimately  essential  for  the
economy. As early as the late 1960s, the Treasury, which played a central role in the regulatory,
bank-based French economic policy of the time, had begun to question the rationale of such a
policy. By the late 1970s, the men in charge there were convinced that changes had to occur. When
they  eventually  convinced  the  socialist  government,  they  presented  their  thesis  as  a  technical
requirement,  not  a  matter  for political  debate.  Daniel  Lebègue is  an emblematic  case here.  An
advisor of Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy in 1981-4, he was not a socialist: he had worked in the
Treasury department since 1969. He left the administration in 1987, at 44, to directly reach the top
of the bank BNP. In 2009, he was a member of the boards of Scor and Technip. In interviews with
Lemoine, he stressed the fear of the early 1980s: France was at risk of being humiliated by the IMF
or by lenders in the Gulf countries. There was a “Treasury thesis” on this problem of the public debt
and  on  the  virtues  of  financial  markets  generally;  it  was  independent  of  personal  political
preferences and spanned the decades before and after the turning point. What we find is that French
firms of the 2000s, when they exhibit an interest for former public officers as CEOs or multiple
board members, very much draw from this pool.
In addition to the ministry of Finance itself, a likely locus of conversion is  Caisse des dépôts et
consignations, a State-owned financial institution closely connected to the ministry, that is supposed
to help cities, departments and regions in their investments. In the 1980s, it also had to rapidly adapt
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to the rules of the financial markets. 12 of our CFS worked there (9 were part of the French nobility,
3 were not):  no other  single  firm employed as  many people  in  our  cohort.  Gilles  Benoist,  for
example, the son of a “top manager of a corporation,” was born in Paris, graduated from Sciences
Po and ENA and worked for the ministry of Internal Affairs, then became the chief of staff of
Jacques Delors. He afterward joined the Caisse, where he worked for eleven years. At that time, the
Caisse faced the opening of competition in the banking sector and the “big bang” of financial
markets  in  France:  it  had  to  adopt  new strategies  of  investment,  and chose  to  accompany the
changes occurring at the time in the financial markets (Lavigne, 1991), for example by contributing
to  decompartmentalize  their  segments.  In  2009,  Gilles  Benoist  was  the  CEO  of  an  insurance
company and sat in the board of Suez.
For the private careers: from commercial to merchant banks
Few non-State nobility careers in our sample begun at the Caisse. Where, then, did the conversion
take  place  for  those?  In  our  1979  cohort,  the  most  common  trajectory  went  through  private,
commercial banks, especially but not only Suez and Paribas, which neither specialized in merchant
banking nor directly provided retail banking. Among 147 CFS in our 1979 cohort, 66 worked for
this type of banks. They had established relationships with industrial firms akin to what is generally
described as  “the Rhineland model”  (Lamard & Stoskopf,  2015):  long-term,  close partnerships
including loans, the buying of a substantive amount of capital, multiple shared directors and an
influence on industrial strategies. The case of Philippe Malet provides a good example. Born in
1925, the son of a member of the  Ponts corps, he graduated from Polytechnique and entered the
even more prestigious  Mines corps. After working in the ministry of Industry and in the staff of
President de Gaulle, he joined Suez in 1963. There,  he was in charge of the relationships with
industrial  companies  Suez  invested  in.  He  became  closely  involved  in  the  strategies  of  many
industrial firms: Compagnie des Mines de Huaron, Compagnie de Mokta, Société Lille-Bonnières et
Colombes, Compagnie des Salins du Midi, Compagnie Lyonnaise des eaux, etc. In 1979, he sat on
more boards than anyone else in SBF120 firms. 
The typical CFS career paths in our 2009 cohort, while they have the same general shape, went
through quite different financial firms. Merchant banks appear much more often than in 1979 (25%
of the 2009 CFS worked there, as compared to 12% of the 1979 CFS). It is especially the case of
Lazard and Rothschild, two banks that were still partnerships when our future CEOs and directors
worked  there.  As  much  as  the  Caisse  des  dépôts,  they  are  very  likely  loci  of  conversion  to
shareholder value, and to market finance more generally: 10 of our CFS worked for Lazard, and 10
for Rothschild. Lazard has been, for a long time, at the heart of financial innovation: as soon as the
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early 1950s, André Meyer, one of the main New York partners of Lazard, sat up a structure that
contributed to define the business model of modern investment funds (Reich, 1986). At the same
time,  the  New  York  branch  of  Lazard  developed  the  business  of  consulting  in  mergers  and
acquisitions,  such as the buying of  Jennings Radio by ITT in 1961, helping to  build the large
conglomerates that flourished in the 1960s in the USA. Lazard New York was also one of the most
aggressive firms in reactivating the policy of hostile takeovers in the beginning of the 1960s. After
the Second World War, all these financial practices had been invented or reactivated in the US, but
they were well known by Parisian partners, who often spent months in New York to complete their
education on the  field.  One of  the first  hostile  takeovers  launched by Lazard in  1964,  that  on
Franco-Wyoming, was appraised by Michel David-Weill, who later became the head of Lazard. The
Parisian heir of a Lazard partner and a graduate from the French high school in New York, then
Sciences Po, he had joined the firm at 29, already as a junior partner. In 2009, he was member of the
boards of Danone (food) and Eurazeo (finance).
However,  such innovations were not easily adopted in France,  at  least  in the first  decades that
followed. The hostile takeover of Antoine Riboux's BSN, advised by Lazard (together with Paribas
and  Neuflize),  against  Saint-Gobain,  failed  in  1969  because  of  the  opposition  of  other  major
Parisian financial institutions (Orange, 2006). It is only later that such techniques were legitimized,
and taught to new firms by those who had (re)conceived them in the 1960s. For example, Antoine
Bernheim was one of the main advisers of Bernard Arnault in his conquest of Boussac, in the early
1980s, and of LVMH a few years later. He was also one of the only members of both our cohorts.
The son of a Parisian lawyer, he studied science, then law at the University and, at 30, became a
partner  in  a  real  estate  firm  belonging  to  his  family,  before  working  for  Lazard,  then  for  an
insurance company. In 1979, he sat at the boards of the retail chain Euromarché, the investment
fund Eurafrance and the real estate company Sefimeg; in 2009, at 80, he was still a director of the
financial firms Bolloré and Eurazeo and the non-financial firms LVMH (luxury), Havas (media) and
Ciments français (cement).
Like the careers of those two heirs, most of our CFS including a span at Lazard were purely private.
Rothschild, however, offered a slightly different path, from the most prestigious parts of the State
nobility (and often ministerial offices) through a merchant bank to the top of financial and non-
financial firms. For example, Nicolas Bazire, a graduate of ENA, was the chief of staff of Prime
Minister Édouard Balladur; he joined Rothschild when Balladur lost the presidential election in
1995. Four years later, he became the managing director of LVMH, in charge of the mergers and
acquisitions. In 2009, he sat in the boards of Carrefour (retailing), Suez Environnement, LVMH and
Atos Origin (digital media). Just like the Caisse, Lazard and Rothschild are two of the main places
where financiers were socialized to the new conception of control that now dominates the firms
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they run. 
Conclusion
The financialisation of French firms and the careers of their top managers and directors are causally
related in an asymmetric way. The financialisation of firms did not disrupt the main career paths and
internal  divides  of  the French economic elite.  The differences  between the social  properties  of
financiers and those of non-financiers have structured the field of the economic elite for decades,
arguably in a much stronger way than divides usually underlined in the literature. This enduring
divide  has  not  been  significantly  modified  by  the  adoption  of  the  shareholder  value.  The
relationship goes very much the other way around, since the financialisation seems to have been
brought about by the conversion of old financiers to new techniques. Therefore, the French story is
very different from the US trajectory as drawn by Zorn (2004): if a new conception of control came
to  be  adopted,  it  is  not  because  those  who  went  through  a  new financial  function  eventually
succeeded in reaching the top of the firms. It is because some financiers whose biographies look
very much like those of 25 or even 50 years earlier converted to new ways of doing business, then
imposed them on firms when they reached the top of their  careers.  Our careful  observation of
careers helps to identify the loci of their conversion. It did not happen because they were trained in
different ways, or because they went abroad, but in specific places and times: the French ministry of
Finance in the early and mid-1980s, the Caisse des dépôts et consignations when the public bank
had to learn and shape new rules of the game, Lazard and Rothschild when the financial techniques
(re)invented  in  the  US in  the  1960s  were  imported  in  the  1980s.  Of  course,  conversions  also
happened  elsewhere,  but  those  organizations  were  certainly  the  main  incubators  of  the  new
conception of control.
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